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Abstract
In 1978, the concept of privacy homomorphism was introduced by Rivest et al. [35].
Since then, homomorphic cryptosystems have gathered researchers’ attention. Most of
the early schemes were either partially homomorphic or not secure. The question then
arose: was fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme possible? And if so, would it
have a practical worth? About thirty years later, Gentry, in his pioneering work [20],
constructed the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The scheme’s security was
based on worst-case problems over ideal lattices [21] along with a sparse subset-sum prob-
lem. A conceptually simpler scheme was proposed in 2010 by Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and
Vaikuntanathan (DGHV). The scheme is over integers instead of ideal lattices, and its
security is based on the hardness of the approximate great common divisor problem (A-
GCD). Afterward, different techniques were proposed to reduce ciphertext noise growth
and to compress the public key size in order to enhance the practicality of FHE. Moreover,
Coron et al. [12] proposed and implemented a scale-invariant of the DGHV scheme and
a number of optimization techniques including modulus switching (MS). However, FHE
over integers is still far from practical. To this end, this work proposes a residue num-
ber system (RNS) variant to FHE of [12], which is also applicable to the DGHV scheme.
The proposed scheme exploits properties of RNS to perform the required operations over
relatively small moduli in parallel. The RNS variant enhances the timing of the original
scheme. The variant scheme also improves the original scheme’s security, since the former
relies only on the hardness of the A-GCD problem and eliminates the need for the sparse-
subset-sum problem used in the original MS procedure. Moreover, the public key elements
that are required for the MS method is slightly reduced in the RNS variant. Finally, our
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Over the recent years, cloud computing has been rapidly developed to fulfill the demand
of outsourcing services. This demand has been driven by critical users whose private data
is required to be held in public and multi-tenancy computing and storage environments.
These environments are subject to a great variety of attacks that compromise user’s sen-
sitive data. To address this issue, sensitive data can be encrypted to make it unreadable
for secure transmission and storage. However, such unreadable data cannot be easily used
for any computation without first being decrypted. This raises security concerns as users’
sensitive data might be vulnerable to theft since it is publicly held by the cloud service
provider, which cannot be trusted. This critical problem requires a solution that allows
processing the unreadable form of the data without revealing it to the external service
provider.
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Figure 1.1: The process of homomorphically evaluating users’ sensitive data over a public
cloud using homomorphic encryption scheme.
1.1 Motivation
In the 1970s, Rivest et al.[35] addressed aforementioned issue by proposing the notion of
privacy homomorphism. This concept defines the encryption scheme, which is known as
homomorphic encryption that can process complicated functions on the unreadable data.
Homomorphic encryption schemes allow users to manipulate their data on external service
providers privately and securely as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
There is a growing body of literature that recognized the importance of the homomor-
phic property and several schemes and protocols were proposed in the past. Unfortunately,
most of these schemes ended up to be unsecured or had the partially homomorphic prop-
erty that supports only a particular class of functions. In 2009, Gentry proposed the first
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that has the ability to evaluate any boolean function
with any depth. Later on, there has been renewed interest in this field where different
FHE schemes were introduced. These schemes are best classified under their security as-
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sumptions. However, current homomorphic schemes are computationally so expensive that
they are considered to be impractical for users whose computation resources are limited.
Therefore, a different track of researchers’ contributions has targeted the development of
practical FHE schemes.
Together, several studies indicate that homomorphic encryption still requires more
improvements to be made for practical usages. Therefore, the objective of this study is to
investigate whether adopting the operations of FHE scheme over an alternative efficient
number system (residue system) will improve the feasibility of our proposed FHE scheme.
1.2 Thesis organization
This thesis is divided into five chapters, each chapter devoted to provide significant infor-
mation to build a road map toward the proposed RNS variant.
Chapter 2 reviews the basic concepts of residue number system arithmetic. Chap-
ter 3 provides a literature review on homomorphic cryptosystems and highlights several
researchers’ contributions in the area. It also presents a full narrative on two main con-
tributions to the fully homomorphic encryption over integers. Chapter 4 presents all the
procedures required to achieve an RNS variant. Chapter 5 lists the contributions of the
thesis and proposes several recommendations and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Residue Number System Arithmetic
The residue number system (RNS) is defined over small independent divisors (known as
moduli). The independence between the moduli allows RNS to be a carry-free, borrow-
free system that naturally performs parallel addition, subtraction, and multiplication. This
property allows RNS to reduce the computation delay. Hence, RNS has gathered consider-
able attention since the last century where it has been implemented in different applications
such as Digital Signal Processing [34], Fast Fourier transform [43], cryptography [4], etc.
The beginning of this chapter introduces initial concepts for residue systems, followed by
RNS forward conversion. Section 2.2 discusses RNS representations, system dynamic range
and moduli preferences and its influence on RNS performance; this section also introduces
the basic RNS arithmetic and its properties. Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 discuss briefly the




Suppose that a and m are integers s.t. a > m. Then for an integer q > 1, one can write
a = q ·m+r where r ∈ [0, m). I.e., q and r are the quotient and the remainder, respectively,





·m ≡ |a|m (2.1)
where b∗c is the floor function and |a|m is a modulo m operation (or a mod m for short).
2.1.2 Linear congruence
Two numbers are said to be congruent when they have the same remainder associated with
the same divisor.
Suppose a, b, r, and m are integers s.t. m divides (a− r) as well as (b− r), which can
be written in the following way:
a ≡ b ≡ r (mod m) (2.2)
The integer r is said to be a residue of a and b with respect to the modulus m, and a, b and
r are congruent modulo m. This implies that there are integers q1, q2 ≥ 0 and r ∈ [0, m)
such that
a ≡ q1 ·m+ r
b ≡ q2 ·m+ r
5
Example 2.1.1. For modulus m = 7, one can say that integers 25, 11 and 4 are congruent
with respect to m. This is because all of them have the same remainder 4 as illustrated in
the following
25 ≡ 11 ≡ 4 (mod 7).
2.2 Arithmetic using RNS
Unlike conventional number systems which consist of weighted numbers, a specific RNS
system is defined over a set of independent co-prime moduli (also known as “base”), B ≡
{m1, m2, · · · , mn} where the system dynamic space is M =
∏n
i=1mi . Accordingly, an in-
teger C has RNS representation defined in the following set: C
RNS−−−→ |c|B = (c1, c2, · · · , cn)
where:
C ≡ ci (mod mi).
Example 2.2.1. Given an RNS defined over base B ≡ {3, 5, 7}, the RNS representation
of C = 442 and X = 69 are:
C = 442 X = 69
442 ≡ 1 (mod 3) 69 ≡ 3 (mod 3)
442 ≡ 2 (mod 5) 69 ≡ 4 (mod 5)
442 ≡ 1 (mod 7) 69 ≡ 6 (mod 7)
RNS→ 442 RNS−−−→ |c|B = (1, 2, 1) 69
RNS−−−→ |x|B = (3, 4, 6)
We note that it is difficult to identify which integer is bigger just based on |c|B and
|x|B, in the sense that |x|B has greater residue values does not indicate that X is bigger.
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This is because RNS is not a weighted number system where the only relationship between
residues is the fact that they form a tuple of remainders to the same integer.
2.2.1 Uniqueness of RNS representation
The uniqueness property implies that there is only one representation associated with a
unique integer C over a set of moduli.
Suppose N and mi are integers s.t. N ≡ 0 (mod mi). Then, for an arbitrary positive
integer C in the interval [0, mi], one can assume that N + C has a unique representation
over mi s.t. N ≡ 0 (mod mi), and accordingly N + 1 ≡ 1 (mod mi) and so on up-to
N + (mi − 1) ≡ mi − 1 (mod mi). The uniqueness property will apply except in case
C = mi where the two numbers N + C and N are congruent.
N + C ≡ N (mod mi) s.t. C = mi
For N = 0, C satisfies the uniqueness property when 0 ≤ C ≤ mi − 1. Likewise, for
an RNS defined by a set of co-prime moduli B ≡ {m1,m2, · · · ,mn}, an integer C has
representation in each modulus s.t. 0 ≤ |C|mi < mi, ∀i ∈ [1, n]. Thus for unique RNS
representation, C should satisfy 0 ≤ C <
∏n
i=1 mi, so that there are no two integers that
have congruent RNS representation over B. In other words, C should be in the system
dynamic space {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1}, where M =
∏n
i=1mi, so that the uniqueness property
holds.
Example 2.2.2. Recalling Ex. 2.2.1, the dynamic space M for the specified RNS over
B ≡ {3, 5, 7} is M =
∏n
i=1 mi = 3 · 5 · 7 = 105. Since N = 442 > M , the resultant
RNS representation |442|B ≡ {1, 2, 1} is not unique. Consequently, there are a number
of integers less than N that share the same representation. Furthermore, their number is
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equal to the quotient of N to M , q = b442
105
c = 4. The four integers are 22, 127, 337 and 442
itself, all of which share the same representation over B:
442 ≡ 337 ≡ 127 ≡ 22 ≡ 1 (mod 3)
442 ≡ 337 ≡ 127 ≡ 22 ≡ 2 (mod 5)
442 ≡ 337 ≡ 127 ≡ 22 ≡ 1 (mod 7)
442 ≡ 337 ≡ 127 ≡ 22 RNS−−−→ {1, 2, 1}
2.2.2 RNS representation over negative integers
In the above discussion, C was assumed to be a positive integer. However, there is a
need for some applications to represent negative integers as well. Generally, the adequate
range for positive and negative integers over RNS is specified by equally dividing the RNS
dynamic space M as discussed below.
For an integer C ∈ Z, the range of the representation over a specific RNS composed of
n independent moduli with dynamic space M =
∏n
i=1 mi is as follows: the range allocated





. Accordingly, the range allocated to









6 C 6 M−1
2
for M is odd
−M
2
6 C 6 M
2
− 1 for M is even
It is worthwhile to mention that the reason for subtracting one in the even space M is
that zero has been assumed to be among the positive integers. Furthermore, the reason





< Cn < M is because Cn considered as complementary of M .
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2.2.3 Moduli preferences
Choosing a proper base for RNS is very important to enhance the performance and ensure
the correctness of such a system. For instance, co-prime moduli set is the natural choice
to ensure correctness. However, different aspects control appropriate (efficient) moduli set
selection in different applications, such aspects as:
• The moduli set should be co-prime.
• To ensure unique representation, the product of moduli should be large enough to
adequate the dynamic range and prevent overflow.
• To enhance speed performace, the moduli bit size should be as small as possible to
reduce computation time [32]. Also, the different bit sizes between moduli should
not be significant. This is because there are no advantages to use small moduli with
large ones [1].
• To ensure efficient binary representation, conversion and arithmetic, the moduli can
be formulated as {2k, 2k − 1, ...2kn, 2kn − 1} [1, 24, 42, 17].
In addition, choosing a random moduli set usually produces an inefficient system that
complicates hardware implementation. Moreover, in the forward conversion and arithmetic
operations, system’s delay is dominated by the worst modulus, and it is worth to mention
that worst modulus might be defined in terms of hardware implementation complexity, or
the largest modulus size. In contrast, reverse conversion is most complicated operation
since its performance is dominated by the characteristic of all moduli.
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2.2.4 RNS arithmetic property
RNS is also known as a residue encoding system. This implies that for a particular integer
C, the associated RNS representation carries independent pieces of information held with
each base. Furthermore, these pieces reassemble the conventional representation of that
integer C. Consequently, the residue representation of integer C also comprises the same
relation that C holds. Given the representations for integers A and B for a specified RNS
over B ≡ {m1,m2, · · · ,mn}
A
RNS−−−→ (a1, a2, · · · , an)
B
RNS−−−→ (b1, b2, · · · , bn)
there is an RNS equivalent to an integer C that satisfies some relation between A and B
s.t. C = A ∝ B. Using the remainder theorem, the residue for both sides associated with
one of the moduli (namely mi) are:
C ≡ ci mod mi (2.3)
A ∝ B ≡ a (mod mi) ∝ b (mod mi) ≡ ce mod mi
recalling linear congruence in Section 2.1.2, which implies that the integer ce is equivalent
to C and ci (mod mi).
C ≡ ce ≡ a ∝ b ≡ ci mod mi
Therefore, the RNS representation of C over B can be formulated as follows:
C = A ∝ B RNS−−−→ (a1 ∝ b1, a2 ∝ b2, ..., an ∝ bn) ≡ (c1, c2, ..., cn) (2.4)
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Addition operation
Eq. (2.4) holds for ∝ being an addition. Thus, for given A, B and C, s.t. C = A+B, the
unique RNS representation of C can be computed as follows:
A
RNS−−−→ ( a1, a2, ... , an )
B
RNS−−−→ ( b1, b2, ... , bn )
C
RNS−−−→ (|a1 + b1|m1 , |a2 + b2|m2 , ..., |an + bn|mn )
where 0 6 A,B 6 C < M =
∏n
i=1 mi.
Example 2.2.3. Let A and B be 46 and 54, respectively. The addition of these integers
over RNS defined over B ≡ {3, 5, 7} can be performed as follows:
Base : { 3, 5, 7 }
A
RNS−−−→ ( 1, 1, 4 )
B
RNS−−−→ ( 0, 4, 5 ) +
C
RNS−−−→ ( |1|3 , |5|5, |9|7 )
Recalling the congruent property, the resultant system of congruence must satisfy all
congruent relationships which gives the following equivalent result ( |1|3, |0|5, |2|7 )⇒
C = 100.
It is worthwhile to mention that |C|B is unique since A, B and C are in the specified
RNS dynamic space M where 0 < A = 46 < B = 54 < C = 100 < 105 = 3 ·5 ·7. Moreover,
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the overflow in base 7 that occurred when adding |4 + 5|7 has no effect on residues of the
other moduli. In conclusion, the addition carried out in each modulus has been done
independently, and the result does not depend on the intermediate overflow in the RNS
moduli; For this reason, RNS is called carry-free (borrow-free) system which enables RNS
to perform correct parallel computation.
Multiplication operation
Similarly, Eq. (2.4) holds for ∝ being a multiplication operation with the same uniqueness
condition for integers A, B and C s.t. C = A × B and 0 6 A,B 6 C < M =
∏n
i=1 mi.
Hence, C can be computed in RNS as follows:
A
RNS−−−→ ( a1, a2, ... , an )
B
RNS−−−→ ( b1, b2, ... , bn )
C
RNS−−−→ (|a1 × b1|m1 , |a2 × b2|m2 , ..., |an × bn|mn )
Example 2.2.4. For RNS defined over B ≡ {3, 5, 7} and for integers A and B that are
equal to 4 and 25, respectively, the multiplication of these two integers can be preformed
as follows:
Bases : { 3, 5, 7 }
A
RNS−−−→ ( 1, 4, 4 )
B
RNS−−−→ ( 1, 0, 4 ) ×
C
RNS−−−→ ( |1|3, |0|5, |2|7 )
12
Similar to addition, the resultant RNS representation of C is unique and satisfies:
0 < A = 4 < B = 25 < C = 100 < 105 = 3 · 5 · 7. Furthermore, the multiplication carried
out in each modulus has been done independently which enables RNS to perform parallel
computation.
Additive inverse:
An integer Cin is said to be the additive inverse to C over base M , if it satisfies the following
relation:
|C + Cin|M ≡ 0 ≡M (2.5)
Then Cin can be written as follows:
Cin = M − C (2.6)
by considering the fact that the representation of negative numbers, M/2 ≤ Cn < M , has
an equal dynamic space as the positive integer, 0 ≤ CP < M/2, as defined in Section 2.2.2.
Therefor, every integer in range 0 < x < M − 1 has a unique additive inverse.
Similar to addition and multiplication, subtraction follows Eq. (2.4) as well s.t. A −
B
RNS−−−→ ( a1− b1, a2− b2, ..., an− bn). In addition, we can use the additive inverse property
to rewrite the subtraction relation into: C = A−Bin
RNS−−−→ ( a1+b1in , a2+b2in , ..., an+bnin).
Example 2.2.5. Given A = 25 and B = 16 in the RNS defined over B ≡ {3, 5, 7},
13
determine A−B.
B : {3, 5, 7}
A = 25
RNS−−−→ (1, 0, 4)
Bin = 16
RNS−−−→ (1, 1, 2) −
C = 9
RNS−−−→ (|0|3, | − 1|5, |2|7)
Recalling the additive inverse property, | − 1|5 ≡ |(5 − 1)|5, we have C
RNS−−−→
{ |0|3, |4|5, |2|7 }. This is equivalent to A + (M − B) = 25 + (105 − 16) = 25 + 89
and can be computed as:
B : {3, 5, 7}
A = 25
RNS−−−→ (1, 0, 4)
Bin = 89
RNS−−−→ (1, 1, 2) +
C = 114
RNS−−−→ (|3|3, |4|5, |9|7)
We note that the RNS’s dynamic space has been equally divided between positive
integers ∈ [0, 53), and negative integers in ∈ [53, 105) where they represent 53 unique
additive inverses for positive integers.
Multiplicative inverse
For non-zero integer C s.t. C and M are co-prime, there is a unique integer X that satisfies:
|C ·X|M ≡ |1|M (2.7)
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where X is said to be the multiplicative inverse to C modulo M , X ≡ C−1 ≡ 1
C
. Recipro-
cally, C is the multiplicative inverse of X modulo M . On the other hand, if C and M are
not co-prime then there is no such integer X that satisfies Eq. (2.7).
Similarly, an integer C has multiplicative inverse in specified RNS, if C is co-prime to
all of the RNS bases. On other words, if there are one or more zero-residues in |C|B, then
C will not have a multiplicative inverse in the space M . For instance, given RNS defined
over B ≡ {3, 5, 7} with M = 105, and C = 15, then C−1 does not exist. This is because
both of the bases 3 and 5 divide C which is clear in the C representation |C|B = (0, 0, 1).
In contrary, for C = 13 with |C|B = (1, 3, 6), C has inverse over M (C−1 = 97). In general,
given a co-prime dynamic range, it is certain that there are a multiplicative inverse for all
space members as illustrated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: The Multiplicative inverse for different moduli.
Prime m=7 Even m=8 Odd m=9
c c−1 c c−1 c c−1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 4 2 None 2 5
3 5 3 3 3 None
4 2 4 None 4 7
5 3 5 5 5 2
6 6 6 None 6 None
7 7 7 4
8 8
Even though there is no explicit expression to determine multiplicative inverse of an
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integer modulo M , Fermat’s theorem can be used for a prime modulus as special case. In
fact, a brute-force algorithm can be used to search for a multiplicative inverse, if it exists,
but this approach is inefficient for large moduli. Thus executing the extended Euclidean
algorithm is considered to be a more efficient alternative.
Division
In contrast to addition and multiplication, performing the division operation in RNS is
more complex. Hence, it is suitable to classify division into categories where the first two
are special cases of the last one:
• Exact division: The division is between two integers where the dividend is exact mul-
tiple of the divisor. For an integer A and B s.t. A = q · B or |A|B ≡ 0, the division
A/B is defined over modulo m as follows:
|A|m ≡ |q ·B|m
Therefore, for the multiplicative inverse of B, we have
|A ·B−1|m ≡ |q|m (2.8)




RNS−−−→ |q|B ≡ ( |a1 · b−11 |m1 , |a2 · b−12 |m2 , ..., |an · b−1n |mn )
Example 2.2.6. Divide A = 1530 by B = 17, which is an exact multiple of the
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dividend A, using RNS defined over B ≡ {23, 29, 31} and M = 20677:
B : { 23, 29, 31 }
A = 1530
RNS−−−→ ( 12, 22, 11 )
|B−1|20677 = 12163
RNS−−−→ ( 19, 12, 11 ) ×
q = |90|20677
RNS−−−→ ( |19|23, |12|29, |11|31 )
where |B|B ≡ (17, 17, 17), and |17−1|23 ≡ 19, |17−1|29 ≡ 12 and|17−1|31 ≡ 11.
Indeed, q = 90 and it is surely true because A is the exact multiple of B. After all,
the exact division can be applied on some applications that ensure zero remainder
division but what if B does not exactly divide A as following:
Example 2.2.7. To discuss the exact division, let the dividend and the divisor be 9
and 3, respectively. Then the exact division modulo 17 is:
q = | 9 · |3−1|17|17 ≡ | 9 · 6 |17 ≡ |3|17
Thus Eq. (2.8) holds, but what about the division of 9 by 4 modulo 17:
q = | 9 · |4−1|17|17 ≡ | 9 · 13 |17 ≡ |15|17
In this case, Eq. ( 2.8) does not hold. This is because there is a remainder included in
the result as illustrated in the following: The exact answer for the above is 2.25 which
consists of = 2 + |4−1|17 ≡ |15|17, as well as for 5/2 = 2.5 = 2 + |2−1|17 ≡ |2 + 9|17
and for 9/5 ≡ 1 + |4 · 5−1|17 ≡ |12|17 (where 4 ≡ |9|5). However, to correct the result,
we apply floor rounding to the division by deducting the remainder of the dividend
as illustrated in scaling division.
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• Scaling division: The divisor, here, is a known constant which consists of one modulus
or the product of multiple moduli. Scaling is much easier and faster than general
division. This is because dividing by a predetermined constant is fairly less complex
and faster than dividing by a random integer.

















= (A− |A|B) · |B−1|M (2.10)
To carry out the above scaling division over specific RNS characterized by B ≡





)B ≡ (|(a1 − ||A|B |m1) · |b−11 |m1 |m1 , |(a2 − ||A|B |m2) · |b−12 |m2 |m2 , · · ·
· · · |(an − ||A|B |mn) · |b−1n |mn |mn)
As mentioned above, it is worth to state that, if B is equal to one or a product of
multiple base elements (denoted as mx), then Eq. (2.10) applies to all base elements
except mx set, and the result will be in RNS dynamic space equal to M/mx. In order
to restore the original space M , base extension is required, and will be discussed in
Section 2.4.
In what follows, two examples will be used to illustrate scaling division by one and
two RNS base elements.
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Example 2.2.8. In RNS defined over B ≡ {3, 5, 7, 11, 13} with M = 15015, scale
A = 1392 by B = 13.
The representation of A in all base elements except m5 is (0, 2, 6, 6), and |A|B ≡ 1,
then we have:
Base : {3, 5, 7, 11 }
A = 1392
RNS−−−→ ( 0, 2, 6, 6 )
|A|m5 = 1
RNS−−−→ ( 1, 1, 1, 1 ) −
A− |A|m5 = 1391
RNS−−−→ ( 2, 1, 5, 5 )





RNS−−−→ ( 2, 1, 5, 5 )
|B−1|M∗ = 622
RNS−−−→ ( 1, 2, 6, 6 ) ×
C = 107
RNS−−−→ ( |2|3, |2|5, |2|7, |8|11)
Note that the result is in the RNS dynamic space M∗ =
M
13
. The final step is to
preform a base extension which will be carried out in Example 2.4.1. An easy way
to return to the original system is to concatenate |107|13 ≡ 3 under base 13. Then,




RNS−−−→ ( |2|3, |2|5, |2|7, |8|11, |3|13)
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• General division is one of the most difficult operations. Currently, there are different
algorithms performing division that can be grouped into two categories based on
their iteration operation [17] [10]. The first category is based on iterative subtrac-
tion and comparison operation, such as in [18, 25, 28, 44] and the second category
is multiplicative iteration algorithms, such as [46]. The former is similar to conven-
tional binary division where it subtracts multiples of the divisor from the dividend
repeatedly until the deference becomes less that the divisor. This carries a prime
disadvantage in the sense that it requires a number of costly sequential (repeated)
magnitude comparisons. The second category, multiplicative division algorithms, de-
termines the quotient by multiplying the reciprocal of the divisor with the dividend.
This approach is based on division by an approximate divisor which is applicable in
scaling algorithms. This procedure introduces some error that can be reduced by
recursion. Unlike the first category, the latter does not require repeated magnitude
comparisons; yet, the disadvantage of the multiplicative division algorithm is that it
does not know when the algorithm should terminate for a given acceptable error.
2.3 Mixed radix conversion
The mixed radix conversion was first mentioned by Garner [19]. This operation is the
conversion from a un-weighted RNS representation to a weighted mixed radix number
system (MRS). The resultant MRS has the same space as the original RNS.
For an integer A represented in RNS defined over {m1,m2, ...,mn}, the corresponding
MRS representation is defined as the following:
A = a′1 + a
′





where |A|m1 ≡ a′1, and the mixed radix of A denoted as MRS(A)= {a′1, a′2, · · · , a′n}.
In order to obtain MRS(A)’s coefficients, a sequence of operations is required. Accord-
ingly, a′2 can be computed by moving a
′
1 to the left hand side, and then taking Eq. (2.11)
mod m2:
|A− a′1|m2 = a′2 ·m1





|A− ( a′1 + a′2 ·m1 )|m3 = a′3 ·m1 ·m2




And so on. Hence, the conversion is a sequential operations where finding a′n requires
finding all a′i, up to i = n− 1. This will slowdown the mixed redix conversion procedure
when we will have a very large number of moduli.
Example 2.3.1. Given RNS defined over B ≡ {3, 5, 7}, convert RNS(85)B = {1, 0, 1} to
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its equivalent representation in MRS
Base : ≡ 3 5 7
A = 85
RNS−−−→ 1 0 1
|A|m1





RNS−−−→ 2 6 ×
3 0 ⇒ a′2 = |3|m2
a′2 = 3






5 ⇒ a′3 = |5|m3
(2.12)
Thus, the corresponding to RNS(85)B ⇒MRS(85)B ≡ (1, 3, 5).
Since MRS is a weighted system, it eases the comparison operation relative to RNS.
Moreover, it is fairly fast in residue computer to perform conversion from RNSB to MRSB
[17]. This advantage applies for small moduli sets which can be efficiently implemented in
hardware.
2.4 Base extension
The operation that is used to extend the original base B of an RNS by adding one or more
moduli is known as base extension. Precisely, this operation determines the residue modulo
mnew from residues of an integer over B. This is in order to expand or restore the RNS
dynamic space M by a factor of the new modulus. Base extension is utilized to achieve
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sign detection, comparison and overflow detection operations [33] and scaling as described
in Example 2.2.8.
Szabo and Tanaka [17] proposed a procedure to find the extra residue modulo mnew.
The procedure converts the un-weighted RNS to its corresponding weighted mixed radix
system.
For RNS characterized by B ≡ {m1,m2, ...,mn} over the interval [0, M =
∏n
i=1mi), the
extended RNS version, by the new base element mnew, will be in the interval [0, M ·mnew).
Thus, the MRS representation, including mnew, will be:
A = a′1 + a
′









Note that the base extension procedure does not change the value of the integer A
thus a′n+1 is clearly equal to zero. Therefore, the residue of A mod mnew can be obtain by
determining all MRS coefficients and use the fact that a′n+1 is zero. The following example
will be used to illustrate the Szabo and Tanaka base conversion procedure.
Example 2.4.1. Recall Ex. 2.2.8, as last step in scaling operation is to recover the base
13 by using base extension.
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First, perform the MRS conversion as follows.
Base : ≡ 3 5 7 11 13
RNS−−−→ 2 2 2 8 c
|A|m1
RNS−−−→ 2 2 2 2 2 − ⇒ a′1 = |107|m0=3




RNS−−−→ 2 5 4 9 ×
0 0 2 9c+ 8 ⇒ a′2 = |0|m1
a′2 = 0
RNS−−−→ 0 0 0 0 −




RNS−−−→ 3 9 8 ×
0 7 7c+ 12 ⇒ a′3 = |0|m2
a′3 = 0
RNS−−−→ 0 0 0 −




RNS−−−→ 8 2 ×
1 c+ 11 ⇒ a′4 = |1|m3
a′4 = 1






6c+ 8 ⇒ a′5 = |0|m4
Secondly, solve the linear equation of the last MRS coefficient to find |A|m5=13, knowing
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that a′5 satisfies a
′
5 = 0 and a
′
5 = 6c+ 8 = 0, as follows.
a′5 = 6c+ 8 = 0 To keep the same value of A
6c = | − 8|13 Additive inverse
6c = 5
c = 5 · |6−1|13 Multiplicative inverse
c = |5 · 11|13 Congruence property
c = |3|13 = 3
Indeed, this is the correct answer where, from Ex. 2.2.8, A = 107 and |A|m5=13 =
|107|m5=13 = 3. We note that the new dynamic space has increased by the factor of
mnew = 13; yet, the value of A is the same.
2.5 Reverse conversion
The reverse conversion is the most complicated part of implementing RNS [29]. Generally,
there are two main approaches to performing reverse conversion, one of which is Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) and the other one is Mixed Radix System (MRS). The latter
will be illustrated directly in Ex. 2.5.2, where the former will be introduced below:
2.5.1 Chinese remainder theorem
For an integer C represented in (c1, c2, ..., cn) over RNS base {m1,m2, ...,mn} with dynamic












, and M =
∏n
i=1 mi.
However, the CRT can be used for a reverse conversion procedure; but first a brief
explanation of Eq. (2.14) will introduced. The CRT breaks an integer C into sum of the
product between a constant xi and residue of C associated to each modulus mi. Therefore,
C can be expressed as follows:
C = cm1 · x1 + cm2 · x2 + ... + cmn · xn











xj = Mj · |M−1j |mj
Indeed, both Mj and |M−1j |mj depend on fixed moduli set in a specified RNS; therefore,
both of them can be computed offline. Furthermore, the multiplication of each cmi · xi can
be done in parallel. Parallel computation should be followed by a modulus M adder to
complete the CRT procedure. This adder is usually large and can adversely affect the
reverse conversion’s hardware implementation. Below is an example for reverse conversion
using CRT.
Example 2.5.1. Find the number whose remainders are (2, 3, 2) to the divisors {3, 5, 7}.
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First, we find both Mj and |M−1j |mj as follows
[m1 = 3]⇒M1 = 5 · 7 = 35
|M−11 |3 = |35|3 = 2
[m2 = 5]⇒M2 = 3 · 7 = 21
|M−12 |5 = |21|5 = 1
[m3 = 7]⇒M3 = 3 · 5 = 15
|M−13 |7 = |15|7 = 1
Next, we perform cmi · xi as follows.
C = 2 · (35 · 2) + 3 · (21 · 1) + 2 · (15 · 1) = 233
Lastly, we reduce C mod M :
|C|M = |105|M ≡ 23
where M = 3 · 5 · 7 = 105
It is important to note that the above last step is necessary to get the desired result in
the RNS dynamic range. Therefore, this might increase the complexity for large dynamic
range M , where costly division is involved.
2.5.2 Reverse conversion using MRS
The advantage of reverse conversion using MRS is that it does not exceed the dynamic range
M as in CRT. Accordingly, this will eliminate an expensive division by M . However reverse
conversion using MRS requires an extra step- conversion to the mixed radix equivalent as
described in Section 2.3.
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Example 2.5.2. Recalling Ex. 2.3.1, for RNS(85)B
RNS−−−→ (1, 0, 1), with B = {3, 5, 7}, the
MRS(85) is (1, 3, 5). Thus, the reverse conversion can be performed simply as below:
C = 1 + 3 · (3) + 5 · (3 · 5) = 85
We note that for a large moduli set the conversion from RNS to decimal is relatively faster




These days, cryptography is being used much more widely than ever before. Cryptography
has led to the development of various security functions such as encryption. For a special
class of encryption, known as homomorphic encryption, the encrypted data can be directly
used for complex operations without being decrypted. Homomorphic encryption is however
not supported by traditional cryptosystems and has largely remained impractical to date.
This chapter presents a literature review on homomorphic encryption by highlighting
several researchers’ contributions to this field. Section 3.1 provides a survey of previous
proposed schemes that partially fulfill the homomorphic property; this section also ad-
dresses basic homomorphic definitions and properties and presents a literature review of
fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Section 3.2 provides a descriptive presentation of
Gentry et al. in [45] scheme and its variant proposed by Coron et al. in [12]. Finally,
Section 3.3 presents a ciphertext batch generalization by Coron et al.
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3.1 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) allows a specific operation to be performed directly on
ciphertexts and generate another ciphertext that encodes the equivalent operation between
plaintexts as follows:
Enc(ma αm mb) ≡ Enc(ma) αc Enc(mb)
where αm and αc are operations over message and ciphertext space, respectively. It is
worthwhile to indicate that αm and αc might not be the same. We say that an encryption
is an additive homomorphic encryption if αm is ⊕, and multiplicative homomorphic if αm is
×. In addition, HE scheme would be able to homomorphically evaluate a specific function
of degree L over encrypted data up to a certain level. HE is also known as a somewhat
homomorphic scheme (SWHE).
Since the proposal of HE initial idea by Rivest et al. [35], different homomorphic
schemes have been proposed, but they are either insecure or can only support one type of
operations (additive or multiplicative) and are known as partially homomorphic schemes.
Such an additive homomorphic scheme was proposed by Goldwasser and Silvio [23] in 1982.
The Goldwasser scheme was secure, nonetheless inefficient because it encrypted one bit with
ciphertext usually of size 1024-bits [Enc(m1)×Enc(m2) ≡ Enc(m1⊕mm2)]. Later in the
probabilistic encryption version [30], Naccache and Stern proposed an additive scheme that
enhanced the poor expansion rate in [23]. In 1999, similar to [23], a scheme was proposed
by Paillier in [31], and its derivative was proposed by Damgrd, and Jurik in [15]. In addi-
tion, existing public key encryption schemes, namely, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [36],
and Taher Elgamal [16] can perform homomorphic multiplication. Furthermore, schemes
as in [2, 5] allowe arbitrary homomorphic additions with limited multiplication depth. It
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is worthwhile mentioning that the Sanders, Young and Yung scheme [37] is able to eval-
uate circuits in NC11, with logarithmic depth, at the expense of exponentially expanding
ciphertext size with circuit depth, hence, increasing their communication complexity and
restricting their circuit to logarithmic depth. The rest of this section provides some basic
definitions.
Basic homomorphic definitions
The following definitions are mostly adopted from Gentry et al. [45].
The scheme ζ ≡ (KeyGen,Encrypt, Eval, Decrypt) is said to be a correct homo-
morphic scheme, if ζ can evaluate any function with arithmetic depth d (namely E(∗)),
which composed of addition and multiplication operations, directly on n-tuple ciphertexts
C = (c1, c2, · · · , cn) and we have the equivalent result over a massage space as follows:
f(m1,m2, ...,mn) ≡ Decrypt(sk, Eval(pk,E(c1, c2, ..., cn))
where ci ←− Encrypt(pk,mi) with a key pair (sk, pk) ←− KeyGen(∗) and massage mi.
And f(∗) is the equivalent function of E(∗) over the message space.
Furthermore, the homomorphic scheme ζ is said to be a compact scheme, if the size
of cout−Eval ←− Eval(pk,E(c1, c2, ..., cn)) is within defined bounds, regardless of the size
or the depth of Eval(pk, ∗). The compactness property controls the practicality and the
security of the scheme; for instance uncompact homomorphically multiplicative scheme can
reveal the depth of multiplication by analyzing the size of Eval(pk, ∗)’s output.
Most likely Eval(pk, ∗) is publicly known; thus the security proof of ζ scheme does not
involve the evaluation function. However, it is essential to security requirements that the
1NCi is the class of decision problems, s.t. NC1 ⊆ NC2... ⊆ NC, computed by boolean circuits of
polynomial number of gates of at most two inputs, and depth O(logi n)
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output of Eval(pk, ∗) does not reveal the inputs (∗) even for third party who has the secret
key sk.
3.1.1 Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
An encryption scheme is said to be fully homomorphic when it implicitly allows evaluating
an arbitrary Boolean circuit over plaintexts by only manipulating the ciphertexts.
In 2009, Gentry [20], in his pioneering work, constructed the first fully homomorphic
encryption scheme. The scheme’s security was based on ideal lattices worst-case problems
[21] along with a sparse subset-sum problem. First, he constructed a HE scheme with
limited multiplication operations namely, a somewhat homomorphic scheme (SWHE). In
SWHE, the ciphertext is constructed with inner noise that grows linearly with addition
and exponentially with multiplication, which limits SWHE’s operation depth up to a cer-
tain bound. In order to achieve the FHE scheme, Gentry's second step was to squash
the decryption circuit so it is transformed to a low degree polynomial. Finally, Gentry’s
breakthrough was refreshing the ciphertext noise using bootstrapping procedure. The pro-
cedure homomorphically evaluates the low degree decryption circuit on the encryption of
the secret key. The result is refreshed ciphertext, which encrypts the original plaintext
under different distribution with reduced noise. Therefore, the SWHE scheme with limited
homomorphic operations is transformed into a fully homomorphic scheme with unlimited
homomorphic operations.
Besides their aggressive analysis on the hardness assumptions of [20], Stehl and Steinfeld
[40] described two optimization techniques for Gentry’s scheme. Their first optimization
technique was proposed to reduce the number of vectors in the sparse subset-sum problem;
their second one was to reduce the degree of the decryption polynomial. The authors
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of [39] suggested several optimization techniques to implement Gentry’s original scheme
with relatively small key and ciphertext size; yet, the implementation did not achieve
the bootstrapping functionality that is needed to have a FHE scheme. However, using
the optimization techniques in [39] and the first optimization in [40] along with other
techniques, Gentry and Halevi in [22] successively implemented the original Gentry scheme.
Since Gentry’s blueprint, fully homomorphic encryption may be divided into three main
groups based on their security assumptions
• Fully homomorphic encryption based on ideal lattices proposed by Gentry in [20]:
The earlier implementation was due to Smart and Vercauteren [39]. They were able
to implement the SWHE of Gentry’s original scheme; but unfortunately, their imple-
mentation was not bootstrappable. Employing the suggestion of [39] with technical
optimization, the authors of [22] introduced the first fully implementation of [20] but
without any enhancement in the performance.
• Fully homomorphic encryption based on Learning with error (LWE) problem pro-
posed by Barkerski and Vaikuntananthan in [8]: The scheme security is based on the
worst-case hardness of short vector problems on arbitrary lattices. The authors also
presented a new dimension-modulus reduction technique that shortens the ciphertext,
which allows [8] to achieve a bootstrapping functionality.
• Fully homomorphic encryption over integers proposed by Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and
Vaikuntanathan [45]: The DGHV security is based on the hardness of the approxi-
mate greatest common divisors problem (A-GCD).
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3.2 Fully homomorphic encryption over integers
Following Gentry’s footsteps in [20], DGHV first constructed SWHE using modulo algebraic
arithmetic, which has limited operation depth. Then they squashed the decryption circuit
and realized bootstrapping to achieve a fully homomorphic encryption scheme by just
operating over integers instead of complex ideal lattices. In general, DGHV is conceptually
simpler than Gentry’s original scheme [20]. This simplicity comes at the expense of large
public key size (around O(λ10) to avoid lattice attacks for a security parameter λ), making
the DGHV scheme far from practical. In order to reduce DGHV complexity, an attempt by
Coron et al. [13] reduced the public key size toO(λ7). In addition, and for similar security
parameters of [13], Coron et al. [14] were able to obtain 10.1 MB public key instead of 802
MB for the full implementation.
However, DGHV requires a bootstrapping procedure after each homomorphic multipli-
cation which is quite expensive. Thus, alternative techniques (so-caled modulus switching
technique (MS)) were proposed in [6] and implemented for DGHV in [14]. In addition, a
scale-invariant to DGHV was introduced in [12] (SI-DGHV) where the authors adopted
some optimization techniques from [13], and public key compression and modulus switch-
ing technique from [14]. They also introduced an optimization to the MS scalar product
to improve SI-DGHV performance; yet, SI-DGHV over integers is still far from practical,
since encryption, decryption and MS take about 5min, 24s and 4.37min, respectively.
As our work focuses on FHE over integers, we provide a bit detailed overview of DGHV
[45] and its variant in [12]. First, we will follow Gentry’s footsteps for constructing a FHE,
and provide a general description of the SWHE scheme with some examples for both [45]
and [12]. Secondly and toward fully homomorphism, two techniques, namely bootstrapping
and modulus switching, are introduced where the former is described in brief and the latter
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in more details.
3.2.1 DGHV over integers
This section first provides a brief description of the somewhat homomorphic encryption
DGHV (SMHE-DGHV) scheme. For this, first we introduce some notations: for a real
number x, we denote bxc, dxe and dxc to be the lower, upper and nearest integer to x,
respectively; moreover, for two integers a and b, we denote |a|b to be a residue modulo b
∈ (−b/2, b/2). However, for a security parameter λ the construction of DGHV is described
as follow:
DGHV.KeyGen(λ): Set the secret key to be a random prime integer p of size η, and let
the distribution over γ and ρ bits integer to be:
Dγ,ρ(p) =
{
choose q ∈ Z ∩ [0, 2γ/p), r ∈ Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : Outputs x = pq + r
}
To obtain public key elements, sample xi ←− Dγ,ρ(p) for i = 0, 1, ..., τ , then re-label
them, so that x0 would be the largest. Restart unless x0 is odd and [x0]p is even.
Thus public key elements are pk = {x0, x1, ..., xτ}.
DGHV.Enc(pk, m ∈ {0, 1}): Choose a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, 3, ..., τ}, and a random
integer r ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ), output:
c = [ 2
∑
i∈S
xi + 2r +m ]x0 (3.1)
DGHV.Evaluate(pk, C, c1, c2, ..., ct): For a circuit C with t input bits and t cipher-
texts, apply the addition and multiplication gates of C to ciphertexts, by performing
all addition and multiplication over the integers, and then output the resultant inte-
ger.
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DGHV.Dec(sk, c): Output m = ( |c|p ) mod 2
SWHE scheme has limited number of homomorphic operations (known as depth) be-
cause the ciphertext’s inner noise grows with respect to the depth and operation type
(addition or multiplication). For illustration purposes, simpler version of Eq. (3.1) is uti-
lized to analysis the noise growth. The simplified ciphertext would then be equivalent to
the following:
c = p · q + 2r +m
where the same DGHV.Dec(*,*) function can be used to recover the message bit m.
Now, given two ciphertexts c1 and c2, the addition over the integers can be performed as
follows:
c1 + c2 = (pq1 + 2r1 +m1) + (pq2 + 2r2 +m2)
c3 = c1 + c2 = p · (q1 + q2) + 2 · (r1 + r2) + (m1 +m2)
where m3 = m1 +m2, r3 = r1 + r2; hence the noise grows at most by ρ+ 1 bits.
The multiplication operation over the integers can also be performed as follows:
c1 · c2 = c4 = p2 · (q1q2) + p · (2q1r2 + 2q2r1 + q1m2 + q2m1)
+4 · (r1r2) + 2 · (r1m2 + r2m1) + (m1m2)
c4 = p · q4 + 2r4 +m4
where m4 = m1m2, r4 = 2r1r2+r1m2+r2m1 and q4 = p·(q1q2)+2q1r2+2q2r1+q1m2+q2m1.
we note that the size of noise growth is 2ρ bits. However, in order to perform correct
decryption the size of the noise should not exceed the modulo size (secret key p), thus we
need:
−p/4 < r3 = r1 + r2 < p/4 for addition
−p/4 < r4 = 2r1r2 + r1m2 + r2m1 < p/4 for multiplication
(3.2)
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For the addition operation, it is obvious that the noise grows linearly with the addition
depth; for instance, the noise growth for the summation of d fresh2 ciphertexts would be at
most of (ρ+ d+ 1) bits. However, the multiplication dominates the noise growth, where it
can say that the noise for multiply d fresh ciphertexts would be d·(ρ+1) bits. Therefor, the
SWHE scheme can perform at most (η−2)/(ρ+1) successful multiplication on ciphertext.
Example 3.2.1. For the hypothetical parameters γ = 18-bits, η = 12-bits, ρ = 4-bits,
and τ = 4, encrypt both m1=1 and m2=0, and determine homomorphically m1 ⊕m2 and
m1 ⊗m2 using DGHV scheme.
First, we generate the private and the public keys
DGHV.KeyGen(λ = 2) ⇒ p = 4013
⇒ x0 = 256846 ←− r = 14, q = 64
⇒ x1 = 232757 ←− r = 3, q = 58
⇒ x2 = 248796 ←− r = −10, q = 62
⇒ x3 = 224714 ←− r = −14, q = 56
⇒ x4 = 240783 ←− r = 3, q = 60
Note that, p is kept secret and pk is [x0, x1, x2, x3, x4]=[256846,248796, 240783, 232757,
224714], with x0 be the largest one s.t. |x0|2 = 1 and ||x0|p|2 = 0.
Secondly, obtain the encryption of both m1 and m2: c1 = DGHV.Enc(pk,m1 = 1) and
c2 = DGHV.Enc(pk,m2 = 0)
c1 = [ 2 (232757 + 224714) + 2(−11) + 1 ]256846 = 208667 for S ∈ {1, 3}
c2 = [ 2 (224714 + 240783) + 2(7) + 0 ]256846 = 160560 for S ∈ {3, 4}
2fresh implies that cipher with noise size ρ bits.
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Thirdly, evaluate both m1 ⊕m2 and m1 ⊗m2: the addition and the multiplication of
c1 and c2 are
c3 = c1 + c2 = 208667 + 160560 = 369227
c4 = c1 · c2 = 208667 · 160560 = 33503573520
Finally, in order to check the correctness of the example scheme setting, we will decrypt
both ciphertexts c3 and c4, but first we note that we have to use Eq. (2.1) to perform
|369227|sk
DGHV.Dec(sk = 4013, c3) ⇒ |(|369227|sk)|2 = 1 ≡ m1 +m2
DGHV.Dec(sk = 4013, c4) ⇒ |(|33503573520|sk)|2 = 0 ≡ m1 ·m2
which is correct.
Indeed, the question now is how many multiplications our SWHE-DGHV can perform
correctly. Let us naively analyze the noise bound to obtain the depth of multiplications. Re-
calling Eq. (2.1) which its result would be ∈ (−p/2, p/2), and knowing that p ∈ [2η−1, 2η),
thus the multiplication depth d using Eq. (3.2) is:




In our example d < 12−2
4+1
= 2. Then for correct decryption we have less than two multipli-
cations. Actually, Gentry et al. [45] also considered the bootstrapping procedure in their
noise bound and they had:
d 6
η − 4− log |f⇀|
ρ+ 2
where |f⇀| is the norm of the multivariate polynomial f(x1;x2; ...;xt) computed by C∗.
C∗ is the associated integer circuit of a Boolean circuit C with t inputs (see [45]).
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Security of SWHE-DGHV
DGHV scheme’s security is based on the hardness of the Approximate-GCD problem that
is defined below:
Definition 3.2.1. (Approximate-GCD) The (ρ, η, γ)-Approximate-GCD problem is: given
polynomially many samples from Dγ,ρ(p) for a random odd integer p of η bits, determine
p, where Dγ,ρ(p), which is a distribution over η bits integer, defined as
Dγ,ρ(p) =
{
choose q ∈ Z ∩ [0, 2γ/p), r ∈ Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : Outputs x = pq + r
}
Thus Approximate-GCD simply tries to guess the common near divisor, namely sk = p,
from the list of public keys x0, x1, ..., xτ , where xi = Dγ,ρ(p) . However, this section
discuss known attacks on just two public elements. Considering Approximate-GCD samples
{x0, x1, ..., xt}, there is a known brute-force attack that approximates the great common
divisor of two samples xi and xj, by guessing ri and rj ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ). The attacker in each
iteration applies p∗ ← gcd(xi, xj), and considering p∗ as a solution if its bit-size equals to η.
Accordingly, the attack running time is approximately 22ρ. Using the Stehle-Zimmermann
algorithm [41] to compute the GCD with time complexity O(γ), the overall brute-force
attack complexity would be 22ρ · O(γ), and accordingly, the size of the noise ρ would be
ω(log λ).
Moreover, there is a variant of the brute-force attack based on factoring xi to determine
η bit factor p∗, and then consider p∗ to be a solution if p∗ is a divisor of xj. The authors
of [45] show that using the Lenstras elliptic curve factoring algorithm [27], the attack
complexity is approximately 2ρ+
√
η. Lattice-based attacks on Approximate-GCD, such as
the attack proposed by Howgrave-Graham (see [26]), the attacker has an advantage when
(ρ/γ) < (η/γ)2. Therefore, γ should satisfy ω(η2 log(λ)).
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In general, the SWHE scheme’s parameters must meet some constraints to avoid known
attacks such as the Howgrave-Graham attack. For a security parameter λ, the scheme’s
parameters are listed in the follow:
• ρ = ω(log λ), to avoid brute-force attacks on the noise
• η ≥ ρ ·Θ(λ log2 λ), to support homomorphic operation for a certain depth.
• γ = ω(η2 log λ), to thwart various lattice-based attacks on the underlying Approxi-
mate GCD problem.
• τ ≥ γ + ω(log λ), to apply the leftover hash Lemma 3.2.1 in the reduction of
Approximate-GCD.
In order to satisfy the above constraints, the SWHE scheme’s parameter can be taken as
ρ = λ, η = O(λ2), γ = O(λ5) and τ = γ+λ [45], which result in a scheme with complexity
O(λ10).
Accomplishing fully homomorphic DGHV scheme
In order to transform the SWHE-DGHV scheme to be fully homomorphic scheme, the
authors of [45] followed Gentry’s blueprint in [20] by homomorphically computing the de-
cryption equation m∗ ⇐= [c − bc/pe]2. Unfortunately, SWHE was incapable of evaluating
their decryption circuit because the decryption circuit required a Boolean circuit with
depth more than SWHE can reach. Thus, squashing the decryption circuit is required to
allow and make SWHE bootstrappable. Consequently, this requires adding extra elements
to make the scheme bootstrappable. The extra elements assemble the secret key in the
form of a large set of secret sparse subsets that sums to the original secret key (sk = p);
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here, the security relies on a sparse subset-sum problem. The procedure is briefly described
in the following:









i∈S sizie (mod 2)⇒ bc/pe, (see [45] for full description).
Further, the idea of bootstrapping is to run the decryption circuit homomorphically on
the noisy ciphertext using an encrypted secret key (given the public key), to obtain fresh
ciphertext with less noise and different distribution that encrypts the same message m.
However, bootstrapping is quite expensive. Thus an alternative technique was proposed in
[6] and implemented for the DGHV in [14]. The new technique, a.k.a. modulus switching
technique, is used to reduce the noise by transforming the ciphertext’s encryption key from
sk1 into a smaller key sk2. It is worthwhile to pointout that the noise is scaled by a factor
of sk2/sk1. Consequently and for d multiplication depth, the modulus switching technique
requires a storage of d secret keys (ski)1≤i≤d, which will increase the storage requirement.
Coron et al. [12] proposed a clever trick that is used to transform a ciphertext’s encryption
key from p2 into a smaller key p, thus scale the noise by 1/p. The new modulus switching
procedure allows SWHE to be leveled FHE scheme whose noise size grows linearly with
the multiplications depth. The following section presents full description of the Coron et
al. procedure.
3.2.2 Homomorphic encryption scheme of Coron et al.
In [12], Coron et al. proposed a variant of the DGHV scheme (denoted as SI-DGHV)
which is considered Leveled FHE scheme as described later in this section. However, the
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SI-DGHV scheme works over mod p2 instead of mod p as in the original DGHV scheme.
The scheme encrypts a message m ∈ {0, 1} as the most significant bit of the ciphertext
c (mod p), rather than the least significant bit (as in the DGHV). Altogether, SWHE
SI-DGHV ciphertext is formulated as follows:
c = q p2 +
p− 1
2
(m+ 2r∗) + r (3.3)
where log2(c) ≤ γ, q ∈ [0, 2γ/p2) ∩ Z, and r and r∗ of size ρ and ρ∗ bits, respectively.
In addition, the ciphertext in Eq. (3.3) is denoted as a type-I ciphertext that can be de-
crypted using m←− (|2 · c|p)mod 2. SWHE SI-DGHV ciphertext is homomorphic scheme,
such that, for two given ciphertexts c1 and c2 which encrypts m1 and m2, respectively.














The addition of c1 and c2 is equivalent to the encryption of | m1 +m2 |2 as follows:
c1 + c2 = (q1 + q2) p
2 + p−1
2
( (m1 +m2) + 2r
∗
3) + (r1 + r2)
where r3 and r
∗
3 of size ρ+ 1, and ρ
∗ + 1, respectively.
The multiplication of c1 and c2 is equivalent to the encryption of | m1 ·m2 |2 as follows:



















(m1 m2) + rp
(3.4)
where c4 is known as type-II ciphertext with noise rp of size ≤ η + ρ+ ρ∗ + 4 .
In contrary to the addition operation where the noise growth linearly with addition
depth; the multiplication operation transforms a ciphertext type-I to type-II whose noise
is greater than modulus p and less than modulus p2.
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Making the SWHE scheme fully homomorphic
The author of [12] used a Convert procedure to convert type-II ciphertext modulo p2
back to t type-I ciphertex by scaling down the product of the ciphertext cp. The concept
of Convert procedure is similar to modulus switching technique in [14] where instead of
switching ciphertext with modulo p to another with modulo p∗, and accordingly scaling
the noise by p∗/p; the Convert procedure will transform a ciphertext with modulo p2 to
another with modulo p to scale the noise by p/p2.




is hidden in sparse subset-sum problem, and p
2η+1
encrypted in cipher type-I. The




by generating sparse subset-sum problem s.t.
2η
p2
= 〈s, z〉+ ε mod 2η with ε ≤ 2−k (3.5)
where s is a vector of Θ bits, kept secret and encrypted in Eq. (3.6). z is a vector of Θ
rational numbers, ∈ [0, 2η), of k precision after binary point.
In addition, different ways are proposed to generate the vector z, naive one proposed
by [9], is by randomly select zi ∈ [0, 2η)2≤i≤Θ, then set z1 that gives
∑
i∈S si zi for a random
set s. Other approach proposed as practical implementation is used in [12]. However, the
secret vector s along with p
2η+1
have to be secured as in the following step.
Secondly, encrypt the secrets s and p
2η+1
in Θ element vector σ.






where q ←− (Z ∩ [0, q0))Θ and r ←− (Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ))Θ are integers.
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Then we have
c' = 2〈σ, c〉 =⇒ 2 · p2 · 〈q, c〉+ 2〈r, c〉+ 2 · p
2η+1
〈c, s〉
where c = (|bc · zie|2η)1≤i≤Θ.
Even though 2p
2η+1
· 〈c, s〉 should scale down the ciphertext by 1/p which reduces the
inner cipher c noise, the multiplication itself adds noise formed in 2〈r, c〉 as well as expands
the size of the ciphertext formed in 2p2 · 〈q, c〉.
In order to reduce the noise and compact the ciphertext, the authors of [12] used
BitDecompη(∗) and PowerOfTwoη(∗) procedures defined in terms of a and b ∈ ZΘ as
follows
BitDecompη(a) ⇒ (a0, a1, a2, · · · aη−1 ) ∈ {0, 1}Θη with ai ∈ {0, 1}Θ
PowerOfTwoη(b) ⇒ (b, 2b, 22b, · · · , 2η−1b) ∈ ZΘη
The approach squashes the multiplicand c = (|bc · zie|2η)1≤i≤Θ in the (Θ× η) matrix using
c∗ ←− BitDecompη(c) and expands s using PowerOfTwoη(s).
The convert procedure requires extra public key elements, namely the vector z and σ
that is defined as follows:






Finally, transform ciphertext type-II to type-I as follows:
c′ = 2〈σ, c∗〉 = 2 · p2 · 〈q, c∗〉+ 2〈r, c∗〉+ p
2η
〈c∗, s〉
The output is type-I ciphertext with noise of size ρ′ = ρ+ log2 Θ + 9 and ρ
∗′ = log2 Θ;
thus the noise grows linearly with multiplication operation and by additive factor of log2 Θ+
9 bits.
To sum up, the scheme’s full description for a security parameter λ is outlined as follows:
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SI-DGHV.KeyGen(λ): Generate odd η bit integer p and γ bits integer x0 = q0 p
2 + r0
with r0 ←− Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ) and q0 ←− Z∩ [0, 2γ/p2); thus, for the defined distribution
over η bit integers:
Dρp,q0 =
{
choose q ∈ Z ∩ [0, q0), r ∈ Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : Outputs x = q p2 + r
}
• Sample xi ←− Dρp,q0 for i = 0, 1, ..., τ of size γ.
• Compute y = y∗ + (p− 1)/2 with y∗ ←− Dρp,q0 .
• Let z be vector of Θ elements, with k = 2γ + 2 bits of precision after binary
point, and s is a vector of Θ bits s.t.
2η
p2
= 〈s, z〉+ ε mod 2η
with ε ≤ 2−k.
• Finally compute






where q and r are random vectors chosen from (Z∩[0, q0))ηΘ, (Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ))ηΘ,
respectively.
Output the secret key sk = {p}, and the public key pk = {x0, x1, ..., xτ , y,σ, z}.





xi +m y]x0 (3.7)
SI-DGHV.Evaluate(pk, c1, c2): The evaluation function performs addition, multipli-
cation and conversion from type-II to type-I operation on ciphertext c.
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• SI-DGHV.Add(pk, c1, c2). Output c3 = |c1 + c2|x0
• SI-DGHV.Convert(pk, c). Output c∗ = 2 〈σ, BitDecompη(c)〉. with c = (|bc ·
zie|2η)1≤i≤Θ.
• SI-DGHV.Mult(pk, c1, c2). Output c←− | SI-DGHV.Convert(pk, 2 c1 · c2) |x0
SI-DGHV.Dec(sk, c}): Output m←− (|2c|p)mod 2
Example 3.2.2. Let us consider a toy example of encrypting m1 = 1 and m2 = 1 and
homomorphically evaluating m1 ⊕m2 and m1 ·m2 : For given security parameter λ = 2
and η = 14 γ = 32, ρ = 5, τ = 5, Θ = 6, the implementation of SIDGHV FHE can be
formed as follows:
SI-DGHV.KeyGen(λ = 2) ⇒ p = 13127
q0p
2 + r ⇒ x0 = 4135635100 ←− r0 = 4, q0 = 24
Dρp,q0 ⇒ x1 = 1895499415 ←− r = −4, q = 11
Dρp,q0 ⇒ x2 = 861590644 ←− r = −1, q = 5
Dρp,q0 ⇒ x3 = 2584771933 ←− r = −2, q = 15
Dρp,q0 ⇒ x4 = 2584771937 ←− r = 2, q = 15




⇒ y = 3963323525 ←− r = −5, q = 23
Randomly generate the public vector z of size Θ− 1 and then randomly choose the secret
subset Sz ⊆ {1, 2, ...,Θ−1}. Lastly, append zΘ−i that satisfies Eq. (3.5) where i is selected
randomly, and accordingly, set the secret vector s. Thus we have the following:
z = [2.9431247067265853e−05, 3.0096133401769087e−05, 1.772869756397344e−05,
2.5342163695651898e−05, 2.7395711602901107e−05, 2.0524299050181383e−05]
s = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1]
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Thus the secret key p = 13127, and the public key ←− {x0, x1, x3, x4, x5, y,z,σ}.
Using public key elements, the ciphertext c1 and c2 can be obtained as follows:
c1 = SI-DGHV.Enc(pk,m1) = [(861590644 + 2584771937) + 3963323525]x0
= 3274051006
c2 = SI-DGHV.Enc(pk,m2) = [(1895499415 + 1550863158) + 3963323525]x0
= 3274050998
where Sc1 = {2, 4} and Sc2 = {1, 5}.
The example first evolution (m1 ⊕m2) can be homomorphically made over the integer
as follows:
c1 + c2 = 3274051006 + 3274050998 = 6548102004
= [6548102004]x0=4135635100 = 2412466904 for compactness
Let us now decrepit (c1 +c2) in order to check the correctness of the example SI-DGHV
setting. We have | ( |2412466904|13127 ) |2 = 0, which implies that | ( |c1 + c2|13127) |2 ≡
m1 ⊕m2 = 0.
The example second evaluation (m1 ·m2) can also be performed over integers as follows:
c4 = 2 c1 × c2 = 2× 3274051006× 3274050998 = 10719409963697203988
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Indeed, c4 is type-II ciphertext that is needed to be converted back to type-I ciphertext.
Therefore, compute c = (|bc × zie|2η)1≤i≤Θ = [4740, 7232, 12236, 693, 12636, 11157], then
c∗ = BitDecomp14(c) and the recovered type-I ciphertext is
c∗p = 2〈c∗,σ〉 = 183346508674
In fact, the type-I ciphertext c∗4 is 44 times x0 (s.t. c
∗
4 = 44x0 + 1378564274); thus to
preserve the ciphertext compactness compute cp = |c∗4|x0 = 1378564274.
Remark. This very last step is important at it provides compactness to the SI-DGHV
scheme as well erase any trace of the SI-DGHV.Evaluate(pk, c1, c2) procedure.
To check the correctness of SI-DGHV homomorphic multiplication, let us decrepit cp:
||1378564274|13127|2 = 1, which implies that ||c1 × c2|13127|2 ≡ m1 ×m2 = 1.
Security of SI-DGHV scheme
Unlike the DGHV scheme, the security of the SI-DGHV scheme is based on a decisional
version of Approximate-GCD problem 3.2.1. The Decisional Approximate-GCD problem
is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.2. (Decisional Approximate-GCD problem) The (ρ, η, γ)-Decisional Ap-
proximate GCD problem is: Let p be a random odd integer of η bits, q0 and r0 are uni-
formly distributed over Z∩ [0, 2γ/p2) and Z∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ), respectively. Given x0 = p2q0 +r0





, determine b ∈ {0, 1}
from z = x+ b× r(mod x0) where x←− Dρp,q0 and r ←− [0, x0) ∩ Z.
Simply, try to distinguish the integer z to be over the distribution Dρp,q0 from being truly
uniform integers ∈ [0, x0). The definition of Decisional Approximate-GCD that adopted
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by [12], and proposed by [9], does not consider public key elements σ and z; however,
as an attacking scenario, the attacker has to guess b∗ with probability Pr[b∗ = 1/b =
0] − Pr[b∗ = 0/b = 0] < εnegl. Further, we have Pr[b∗ = 1/b = 0] = 1/2 because
∑
i∈S xi
(mod x0) has a distribution with statistical distance from the uniform distribution at most
ε ≤ 1
2
|DSI−DGHV −Duniform|∀x∈pk. This can be proved using the following modified leftover
hash lemma (LHL) used by [45]:
Lemma 3.2.1. Set x1, · · · , xτ ←− Z2γ uniformly and independently, and set y =
∑
i∈S xi




Therefore, to make the distance ε = 2
1
2
(γ−τ) negligible, the constraint on the public key
over Dρp,q0 should satisfy τ > γ + 2λ.
3.3 Batching SI-DGHV scheme
In general, the process of compacting l bits (m0,m1, · · · ,ml−1) into a single ciphertext
and yet supporting pairwise homomorphic evaluation over each mi, is known as batching
a homomorphic scheme. The authors of [12] proposed generalization of batch setting in
[7, 11, 8]. The batch generalization forms RNS with respect to base Bp of (l) co-prime
moduli p20, ..., p
2
l−1. Consequently, the public key elements would be:
x0 = q0 · π2 + CRTBp(r0,0, ..., rl−1,0)
xj = qj · π2 + CRTBp(r0,j, ..., rl−1,j) j ∈ [0, τ)











i=0 pi is co-prime with q0 ∈ [0, 2γ/π2), and qj, qi ∈ Z∩ [0, q0) , r0, ..., rl−1 ∈
Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ).
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Because of the independence between the RNS channels, the addition of two CCRT1 +C
CRT
2
yields a new ciphertext CCRT3 that encrypts the bitwise sum modulo 2 to decryption of
both CCRT1 and C
CRT





batched ciphertext of type-II.




Similar to the un-batched ciphertext of type-II, the corresponding batched ciphertext
can be converted using the same SI-DGHV.Convert(∗) procedure but for z be vector of
Θ elements, with k = 2γ + 2 bits of precision after binary point. Also, we have s to be l
vectors of Θ bits s.t.
2η
p2i
= 〈si, z〉+ εi mod 2η ∀i ∈ [0, l )
with εi ≤ 2−k.
Accordingly, and for s̃i = PowerOfTwoη(si), we have σ = (σ1, σ2, ...,σηΘ) with σi
defined as follows:














where q and r are random vectors chosen from (Z∩ [0, q0))ηΘ, (Z∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ))ηΘ, respec-
tively.
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Therefore, and for cp = (|b CCRTp · zie|2η)1≤i≤Θ, the recovered type-I batched ciphertext
is
c∗ ← 2〈σ, BitDecompη(cp)〉
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Chapter 4
RNS version of Fully Homomorphic
Encryption over Integers
4.1 Problem statement
The homomorphic encryption proposed in [45] and its variant [12], are still considered
to be far from practical because they deal with very large integers and require a huge
amount of operations. This issue has motivated us to improve the practicality of the
scheme in [12] (and [45] as well) by adopting SI-DGHV.Mult(*) and SI-DGHV.Add(*) in
RNS, as well as the SI-DGHV.Convert(*) procedure. The RNS adoption will improve
the timing performance of SI-DGHV which, by virtue of RNS, the SI-DGHV.Evaluate(*)
and SI-DGHV.Convert(*) operate in parallel and over relatively small size moduli. The
RNS version of SI-DGHV.Convert(*) preserves the original procedure functionality with
improvement in the security hardness by eliminating the need for a sparse subset sum
problem in the security requirement.
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Other optimizations are available to enhance the multiplication complexity of [12]; for
instance, one can use an efficient multiplication algorithm such as Karatsuba, Toom-Cook,
and Schonhage-Strassen. Different optimization techniques have been already adopted by
Coron et al. such as the one-multiplication technique [14], τ reduction technique [13],
and public key compression techniques [14, 11]. These techniques are related to the ex-
pensive procedures required by the subset-sum assumption. Our variant can utilize the
public key compression techniques [14, 11]; however, it does not require the use of the
one-multiplication technique and the τ reduction because RNS.Convert(*) uses slightly
different approach than SI-DGHV.Convert(*).
This chapter presents the RNS variant of the SI-DGHV scheme [12]. Section 4.2 in-
troduces the main concept of an RNS variant, and Section 4.3 presents the RNS’s actual
implementation. RNS base constraints, the Montgomery modulo reduction, base conver-
sion, and ciphertext batching are introduced in Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8. Section 4.9
provides a semantic security proof of the RNS variant. Finally, Sections 4.10 and 4.11
present our complexity estimation and noise growth analysis for both schemes.
4.2 Preliminary
In this section a general overview of the RNS variant of [12] is presented.
Recalling the SI-DGHV scheme, the encryption of message mi with a given prime
integer p of size η is:






i ) + ri (4.1)
where ci, ri and r
∗
i are of size γ, ρ and ρ
∗ bits, respectively, and q ∈ [0, 2γ/p2).
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As discussed in Chapter 2 and for a given proper RNS base B with M =
∏n
i=0mi >
22γ+2, the ciphertext (4.1) can be uniquely represented in the RNS base. Similar to [12],
the execution of SI-DGHV.mult(∗) and SI-DGHV.add(∗) can be done correctly and in
parallel over the RNS base. Furthermore, the result from SI-DGHV.mult(∗) is ciphertext
of type-II (cp formulated in Eq. (3.4)) that has to be scaled by a factor of 1/p in order to
restore type-I ciphertext which can be performed using SI-DGHV .Convert(∗). Unlike to
[12], the RNS version of SI-DGHV .Convert(∗) (hereafter simply RNS.Convert(∗)) does
not use the subset-sum problem to hide the secret key.
The RNS.Convert(∗) will use the following two lemmas.





































which concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.2.2. For an even integer M∗ and a given ciphertext as in Eq. (3.4) with log2(rp) <
ρx = η + ρ+ ρ




= qp ·M∗ +
M∗
2
mp + r (4.3)
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q∗p · p2 +
p2 − 1
2
(m1 ·m2) + rp
)






















= qp · p+
p− 1
2





















· (2ρx + 0.5) ) and the result is
type-I ciphertext with noise that is scaled by 1/p.
4.3 RNS implementation
Through this chapter, we will use two RNS co-prime bases B = {m1, ...,mn} with M =∏n





∗) = 1. Moreover, we
will assume that the modulus bit size in both bases are the same and equal to V bits;
thus, for an integer c, the RNS representations are denoted as |c|B ≡ (|c|m1 , ..., |c|mn) and
|c|B∗ ≡ (|c|m∗1 , ..., |c|m∗t ) in bases B and B
∗, respectively.
However, the main idea of RNS.Convert(∗) is to perform the computation specified in









Accordingly, we can compute cp · |χ ·M−1|M∗ in base B∗, and |cp · χ|M in base B, then
compute over all |cp ·χ|M · |M−1|M∗ over B∗. Lastly, the output of Eq. (4.5) will be in base
B∗ which needs to be converted back to base B for further evaluation.
Eq. (4.5) requires the result of the multiplication, cp = 2c1 · c2, to be in B ∪B∗ because
we need both |cp|B and |cp|B∗ . This extra multiplication over base B∗ is of low cost with t
elementary multiplications over relatively small size moduli.
However, χ and the factor p/M∗ in Eq. (4.4) contain the secret p, thus it must be
encrypted using SI-DGHV distribution Dρp,q0 . The following is complete description of the
RNS.convert(∗) procedure which is divided into two main procedures (cp · |χ ·M−1|M∗ and
|cp · χ|M · |M−1|M∗) followed by reduction modulo x0.
Computing cp · |χ ·M−1|M∗ . The computation will be done in base B∗; thus we need
cp in B∗ and χ ·M−1 (mod M∗). Furthermore, and in order to have correct multiplication,
cp has to be assembled on the fly using the following definition of DecB∗(∗) and PowB∗(∗)
functions:
DecB∗(cp) =


























Thus we have 〈DecB∗(cp), PowB∗(|χ ·M−1|M∗)〉 ≡ cp · χ ·M−1 (mod M∗).
As mentioned above, χ, which is represented in the vector PowB∗(|χ ·M−1|M∗), along
with the factor p/M∗, must be encrypted using Dρp,q0 . For this reason, we generate the
vector of encryptions KB∗ as follows:






∈ [0, 2γ )t (4.7)
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where q ∈ [0, 2γ/p2)t and r ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ)t.
Computing −|cp · χ|M · |M−1|M∗ . From Eq. (4.5), the computation of |cp · χ| has to
be in B and at same time the inverse of M in base B∗; but, we need both computations in
base B∗. Therefore we will use an equivalent as follows:
n∑
i=1
|cp|mi · |χ ·M−1i |mi ·Mi = |cp · χ|M + α ·M , 0 ≤ α < n · 2v (4.8)
where Mi = M/mi.
Similar to the previous computation, the term |χ ·M−1i |mi has to be encrypted as well:










where q ∈ [0, 2γ/p2)n and r ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ)n.
Run RNS.convert(KB, KB∗ , |cp|B∗ , |cp|B). Let us consider both vectors KB and KB∗
to be pre-computed and publicly known; thus for a given cp in both bases (|cp|B∗ , |cp|B),
we compute on-the-fly DecB∗(|cp|B∗) and then output













where 〈a, b〉 is the dot product of vectors a and b. We note that Eq. (4.10) is computed
over base B∗.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let c1 and c2 be two type-I ciphertexts with noise size at most (ρtype1, V +
log2(t + n)), and cp = 2c1 · c2 be a type-II ciphertext with noise size ρtype2 ≤ η + ρtype1 +
V + log2(t + n) + 4. Using RNS.Convert(∗) in Eq. (4.10), the conversion of cp, with
ρtype2 ≥ max(η + ρtype1 + V + log2(t + n) + 4, 2η + t(1 − V)), is a type-I ciphertext, with
noise (ρtype1, ρ
∗
type1) ≤ (ρtype2+2−η, V+log2(t+n)). The procedure yields type-I ciphertext
with a noise growth at most V + log2(t+ n) + 6 bits.
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|m∗i qi → 0 < Q






|m∗i ri → |R
∗| < t 2ρ+V+1














· (|χ ·M−1 M∗i |M∗)1≤i≤t + (vi)1≤i≤t





























|cpχM−1|M∗ + α∗p+ V ∗
(4.12)
where |V ∗|, α∗ < t 2V .





















i=1 |cp|mi · qi → 0 < Q < n 2γ+V+1−2η
R = 2
∑n
i=1 |cp|mi · ri → |R| < n 2ρ+V+1
58













































i=1 |cp|mi · |χ ·M
−1












i=1 |cp|miv∗i , α1 and α2 < n 2V and α3 < n 2V+1.













































































where e = V ∗ − V and α4 is an integer.
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= p qp +
p− 1
2
·mp + r∗∗ + α4 · p+ e







· (2q∗p +mp) + r∗∗∗2
where





(2ρx + 0.5) )





(2ρtype2 + 0.5) )
q∗p < (t+ n) 2
V






(2ρtype2 + 0.5) )
It is worthwhile to mention that q∗p and r
∗∗∗
2 are integers since α4 and e are integers.
In conclusion, from (4.15) we obtain:








Q = (t+ n) 2γ+V+1−2η
q∗p < (t+ n) 2
V
|R| < (t+ n) 2ρtype1+V+1
|r∗∗∗2 | ' max(2ρx+1−η, 2η+1+t(1−V))
ctype−I < (t+ n) 2
γ+V+2
(4.18)
which concludes the proof.
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4.4 Constraints on RNS bases
For base B, M has to contain the product of two ciphertext (cp = 2c1 · c2); thus, it
should satisfy M =
∏n
i=1mi > 2
2γ+1. Accordingly, the dynamic space of B∗ should satisfy
M∗ > (n+ t) 2γ+V+3 in order to contain the recovered ctype−I in (4.17).
Following the assumption that the size of the moduli in both bases B and B∗ are the
same and equal to V bits, and it is sufficient to have:
n(V − 1) ≥ 2γ + 2
t(V − 1) ≥ log2(t+ n) + γ + V + 3
Moreover, it is necessity to have 2γ + 1 < nV , in all the above, we assumed that mi ∈
[2V−1, 2V − 1], and gcd(mi,mj) = 1 with (i 6= j).
In addition, We note that for asymptotic computational complexity, the relationship
between n and the ciphertext size γ = O(λφ) can be written as:




for an integer β satisfying γ ∈ Ω(λβ) and an integer φ that satisfies the scheme security
requirements (i.e., φ = 5 in DGHV).
Proof. The number of primes of size V bits is
(#primes < 2V) ≈ 2
V
V · ln(2)






Thus V ≈ log2((2γ + 5) · ln(2)), and for γ ∈ Ω(λβ) we have
n ∈ O( λ
φ
β · log2(2λ) + log2(ln(2))





4.5 Reduce the result modulo x0
From (4.18), the quantity obtained in (4.17) has at most log2(t+n)+V+2 extra bits than
type-I ciphertext. Thus, the ciphertext in (4.17) has to be reduced modulo x0 in order to
preserve the scheme’s compactness.
Furthermore, the reduction has to be in the RNS base, which can be achieved including
a new auxiliary modulus m̃ into base B∗. This decompose a new base B̃ as B∗ ∪ m̃ (and
accordingly M̃ = M∗ · m̃).
Therefore, for an odd modulus m̃ co-prime to x0 and M
∗, we can define a reduction of
the quantity obtained in (4.17) as follows:
c̃ =
ctype−I + x0 · | − ctype−I/x0|m̃
m̃
≡ ctype−I · m̃−1 mod x0 (4.20)




|c̃| < x0 + 2γ ·
2k
m̃
≤ 2x0 and we also have k = log2(t+ n) + V + 2 (see Eq. (4.18)).
However, the result from Eq. (4.20) will have an extra element m̃−1. To eliminate m̃−1,
we will multiply the recovered ciphertext ctype−I by m̃ and get c
∗
type−I . But we want to
perform this multiplication without any extra cost, thus the multiplication will be impeded
in RNS.Convert(∗) procedure by modifying both KB and KB∗ to be:

















The procedure described in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.5.1. For a given type-II ciphertext cp in both bases B̃ and B (|cp|B̃ and |cp|B),
the type-I ciphertext c∗type−I can be obtained using both K̃B and K̃B̃ as follows:
c∗type−I ← RNS.convert(K̃B, K̃B̃, |cp|B̃, |cp|B). (4.23)
where B̃ as B∗ ∪ m̃.
Proof. As a sketch proof that follows the same procedures in the proof of Lemma 4.3.1,




∪ |cp|B where yi < 2V , we have:
c∗type−I = 2 ·
(t+1)+n∑
i=1
yi · |(p2 · qi + ri) · m̃|x0 + m̃(
p− 1
2
· (2q∗p +mp) + r∗∗∗2 )


























adding them both we get m̃ · (p− 1
2
· (2q∗p +mp) + r∗∗∗2 ) which conclude the proof.
As a remark, we have:∑(t+1)+n
i=1 yi · |(p2 · q + r) · m̃|x0 = |(p2 ·
∑(t+1)+n
i=1 yi · qi +
∑(t+1)+n
i=1 yi · ri) · m̃|x0 + αx0
= |(p2 ·Q+R) · m̃|x0 + αx0
where α ≤ (t+ n) · 2V .
Finally, we are ready to perform the reduction modulo x0 as described in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.5.2. For a recovered ciphertext c∗type−I in (4.7) and an auxiliary modulus m̃ >
(t+ n) · 2V+1 + 2, the reduction modulo x0 of c∗type−I can be done using (4.20).
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Proof. For a given c∗type−I in (4.7) and using (4.20), we have:
c̃ =
c∗type−I + x0 · | − c∗type−I/x0|m̃
m̃
=





(2q∗p +mp) + r
∗∗∗
2
= p2 ·Q+R + α∗x0 + (
p− 1
2
· (2q∗p +mp) + r∗∗∗2 )
= p2 ·Q∗ +R∗ + (p− 1
2
· (2q∗p +mp) + r∗∗∗2 )
(4.24)
where α∗ is an integer, Q∗ = Q + α∗q0 and |R∗| ≤ |R + α∗r0| < (t + n) · 2ρtype1+V+4 when
x0 = p
2q0 + r0.
Moreover, from (4.24), by using central reminder theorem | − ((p2 · Q + R) · m̃|x0 +




Assume that h = (0.5 +
α + 1
m̃
) is a rational number; thus to reduce c∗type−I , we should
have h < 1. In order to have h < 1, and given that α ≤ (t + n) · 2V (see Lemma 4.5.1
proof) , we have
0.5m̃ > α + 1
m̃ > (t+ n) · 2V+1 + 2 (4.25)
Finally, using m̃ > (t+ n) · 2V+1 + 2, the reduced ciphertext modulo x0 is given below




where r̃ = R∗ + r∗∗∗2 , q̃ = Q
∗ and with
q∗p = (t+ n) 2
V
|r̃| < (t+ n) · 2ρtype1+V+4 + max(2ρx+1−η, 2η+1+t(1−V))
c̃ < x0
(4.27)
which conclude the proof.
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The above implies that the RNS dynamic space M has to contain |2c1c2| < 2(x0)2;
accordingly, the system’s dynamic space should satisfy M > 22γ+1.
4.6 Exact base conversion
Up to now, we have recovered compact type-I ciphertext in base B∗ (4.26). To complete
the next level of evaluations, we need to perform base conversion B∗ → B. A naive way
to perform a base conversion is to reconstruct |c̃|B∗ into the positional number system and
then convert it back to RNS in base B. The whole procedure is illustrated in the following:








i = c̃+ αM
∗ (4.28)
where 0 < α ≤ t− 1.
Then, RNS forward conversion, to base B, can be applied on (4.28) to have |c̃∗|B.
c̃∗i = |c̃|mi + |αM∗|mi ∀ i ∈ [0, n) (4.29)
Yet, the result is not an exact base conversion due to the extra term |αM∗|mi . Therefore,
to obtain the correct |c̃|B, we have to subtract |αM∗|B from |c̃∗|B which requires finding α.
The authors in [38] proposed a technique to obtain α by using an extra redundant modulus














which could be carried out through the computation of (4.26) or use base
65
extension. Finally, rearrange the above to have [38]:
α =
∣∣∣∣|M∗−1|m∗t · ( t−1∑
i=0






Lemma 4.6.1. For an integer c̃ < x0 in RNS base B∗ with M∗ ·m∗t > x0 and m∗t ≥ t, the














∣∣∣∣|M∗−1|m∗t · ( t−1∑
i=0





The work of Bajard et al. used further optimization to reduce the size of M∗ by
adopting part of m∗t in the dynamic space M
∗ as follows [3]:
Lemma 4.6.2. For an integer c̃ < 3 ·x0 in RNS base B∗ with M∗ = M∗∗ ·β > 3x0 for β ≥ 1,
the exact base conversion (|c̃|B∗ → |c̃|B) using (4.32) and (4.31) follows the assumption
that m∗t ≥ 2 · (t− 1 + dβe) and M∗∗ · β > 3x0.
4.7 Putting it together
Below, we sketch the new RNS variant scheme showing the sequence in which various
procedures are called.
RNS homomorphic evaluation: The evaluation is done over both bases (B and B∗)
and over m∗t and m̃. For two type-I ciphertexts C1 and C2, the RNS evaluation is:
C1 + C2
RNS−−−→ (|c1 + c2|B, |c1 + c2|B∗∪ m̃ ∪m∗t )
C1 × C2
RNS−−−→ (|c1 × c2|B, |c1 × c2|B∗∪ m̃ ∪m∗t )
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RNS convert procedure: RNS.Convert(∗) procedure is used to transform a noisy type-
II to type-I ciphertext with a scaled noise. The procedure as described in Section 4.3
is performed over both bases B and B̃∗ = B∗ ∪ m̃ ∪m∗t , and the result will be in B̃∗.
|c∗type−I |B̃∗ ← RNS.convert(K̃B, K̃B̃∗ , |cp|B̃∗ , |cp|B).
Reduction modulo x0: The reduction is used to preserve the scheme’s compactness and
performed over B∗ ∪m∗t .
Exact base conversion: This is the very last procedure in our RNS variant. The proce-
dure is used to recover the base B and modulus m̃ for the next level of evaluation.
Figure 4.1: A block diagram showing the sequence of various procedures of the new RNS
variant scheme.
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To sum up, the previous sections show how the new RNS variant successfully recovers
and reduces type-I ciphertexts and Figure 4.1 depicts how the RNS moduli change from
one procedure to another.
4.8 Ciphertext batching
Similar to [7, 11, 8] and [12], and as described in Chapter 3, the type-I ciphertext for a
given l bit message (mi)0≤i<l−1 encrypted using secret p0, ..., pl−1 of η bits is:















i=0 pi is co-prime with q0 ∈ [0, 2γ/π2), and log2(|ri|) < ρ, log2(|r∗i |) < ρ∗ and
q ∈ Z ∩ [0, q0).
Thus, the multiplication of c1 and c2 yields component wise batched type-II ciphertext.




with similar noise log2(|r
(i)
p |) < ρx = η + ρ+ ρ∗ + 4 as un-batched ciphertext type-II.
Like the un-batched ciphertext type-II, the batched ciphertext type-II can be converted






for each secret pi. Now we define the batched version of both
KB and KB∗ as follows:

































where q ∈ [0, q0)n and ri,j ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) and q∗ ∈ [0, q0)t, r−i,j ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ).
4.9 Semantic security
The semantic security of the RNS variant follows the variant of the Approximate-GCD
problem introduced in [9] and [12]. For given an integer z, it is hard to distinguish whether
z is from Dρp,q0 or a truly uniform integer ∈ [0, x0), where:
Dρp,q0 =
{
choose q ←− Z ∩ [0, q0), r ←− Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : Outputs x = q p2 + r
}
Definition 4.9.1. (Decisional Approximate-GCD problem) The (ρ, η, γ)-Decisional Approximate-
GCD problem is: for a random η bit prime p, given a γ bit integer x0 = p
2q0 + r0 and





, determine b ∈ {0, 1} from
z = x+ b× r (mod x0) where x←− Dρp,q0 and r ←− [0, x0) ∩ Z.
The assumption is that the Decisional Approximate-GCD problem is hard for any
polynomial time attacker which implies the hardness of determining whether b is 0 or 1.
Similarly, using the reduction of the Decisional Approximate-GCD problem [9], the se-
curity of batched RNS variant is based on (ρ, η, γ)-l-Decisional Approximate-GCD problem
which is as in the original scheme. Below is the problem definition:
Definition 4.9.2. (l-Decisional Approximate-GCD problem) The (ρ, η, γ,)-l-Decisional
Approximate-GCD problem is: Consider l random η bit primes p0, p1, ...pl−1, and a γ bit
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integer x0 = π
2q0+CRTp0,...pl−1(r0, ...rl−1) where q0 ∈ Z∩[0, 2γ/p2), and ri ∈ Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ).









i for 0 ≤ i < l, determine b ∈ {0, 1} from z = x + b × c ( mod x0) where
x←− Dρq0,p1,...pl−1 , c←− [0, x0) ∩ Z and
Dρq0,p1,...pl−1 =
{
Outputs CRTq0,p0,...pl−1(q, r0, ...rl−1) : q ∈ Z ∩ [0, q0), ri ∈ Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ)
}
.
In addition, the RNS variant scheme is semantically secure under extra public key
elements KB∗ and KB; and since the security of both KB∗ and KB only depend on Decisional
Approximate-GCD problem as in the previous work [12, 9, 14], the RNS variant’s security is
based on Decisional Approximate-GCD assumptions. Therefore, the RNS variant enhances
the security assumption of FHE over integers by eliminating the need for subset sum
problem.
4.10 Estimation of complexity
Throughout this section, we will use the definition of elementary operations over a word
that fits in V bits. Thus each V bits of positional number system is considered as a word.
Now our elementary operations are defined as follows: 1
• Elementary multiplication of two words denoted as EM and the notation for modulo
reduction is M.
• Elementary modular multiplication is denoted as EMM which corresponds to an
elementary multiplication modulo mi (i.e. |2c1 · c2|B requires n EMM).
1The notation are mostly adopted from Bajard et al. [3].
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• Dot modular product over x moduli is denoted as DMPx. This is costlier compared
to EM and EMM; yet, the cost of the inner modulo reduction can be reduced by
using lazy reduction (i.e. 〈|a|B, |b|B〉 requires n DMPn where n = #B )
Another remark, to simplify our complexity estimation, the estimation does not consider
the two auxiliary moduli m̃ and m∗t since t, and n >> 2.
For bases B ≡ {m1, ...,mn} and B∗ ≡ {m∗1, ...,m∗t}, the multiplication between two
type-I ciphertexts (2c1 · c2) has to be done in both bases B and B∗; therefore, we need n+ t
EMM.
Furthermore, to convert from type-II to type-I, we have to compute (4.10), throughout
(4.11) and (4.13) requiring t EMM, t2 DMPt and nt DMPn. This cost can be reduced to
(t+ t2 + nt) EMM and (t+ 1) M using lazy reduction:
DecB∗(cp) =


























]⇒ t2 DMPt + nt DMPn
In addition, the Montgomery reduction in Section 4.5 requires 2+ t EMM in total using
(4.20) in bases B∗:
c̃ =
ctype−I + x0 · | − ctype−I/x0|m̃
m̃
⇒ 2 + t EMM












∣∣∣∣|M∗−1|m∗t · ( t−1∑
i=0
















⇒ t(n+ 2) EMM and n M
Therefore, the total cost for RNS multiplication and conversion is:








for n ≈ 2t.
It is easy to show that the original scheme’s complexity is Θ · n2 + t2 which can be




n2 + 4n+ 3) EMM vs (Θ · n2 + n2/4) EM
Therefore, the asymptotic complexity comparison for the two schemes is
O(n2) vs O(Θ · n2)
The original scheme complexity can be reduced from O(Θ · n2) to O(Θ · n1+ε) where
ε depends on the underlying multiplication algorithm such as Karatsuba, Toom-Cook or
Schonhage-Strassen (e.g., ε = 0.585 using the Karatsuba algorithm). In addition, the RNS
variant of [12] can be fully parallelized, and accordingly one can have an area and a delay
linearly with n (i.e., Cdelay = O(n)).
Therefore, using the approximation Θ ∼ ω(n), the RNS variant shows an advantage
over the original scheme by almost n.
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4.11 Noise growth analysis
This section discusses the noise analysis of both schemes. The analysis compares the noise
added by each scheme. The compression will be in the asymptotic sense and based on the
previous implementation parameters. As described in Chapter 3, using SI-DGHV.Convert(*)
procedure, the recovered type-I ciphertext will have a noise of size:
ρp = ρ+ log2(Θ) + 9
ρ∗p = log2(Θ)
(4.35)
where ρ is the noise size of the original ciphertext and Θ is the vector size of the public
key z. In addition, it has also been shown (in Section 4.3) that the noise growth in the
RNS variant is around
ρp = ρ+ V + log2(n+ t) + 6
ρ∗p = V + log2(n+ t)
(4.36)
where n and t are the number of RNS mudoli of V bits.
Therefore, the asymptotic comparison of the RNS variant and the original scheme is:
O(2λ+ φ · log2(3λ)− log2(2β · log2(2λ)) ) vs O(λ+ log2(L · λ)) (4.37)
where γ = O(λφ), V < O(λ), and L is the depth of homomorphic operation.
This indicates that the FHE over integers becomes leveled FHE in the sense that it has
certain level of operation depth. Considering that for a type-I ciphertext (as in (4.17)),




|r∗∗∗2 |+ |q∗p| < p/4
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To have a fair compassion, we can compute the actual level of operations that both
schemes can reach under the same security parameters.
dRNS <
η − 2− ρ
V + log2(n+ t) + 6
dSI-DGHV <





V + log2(n+ t) + 6
· dSI-DGHV
For using the same security parameters dRNS ≈ 0.39 · dSI-DGHV. We note that the two
schemes have different parameters affecting the noise growth– the RNS variant is mainly
affected by ciphertext size whereas the SI-DGHV depends on the subset sum assumption.
Accordingly, more optimization has to be done for the RNS variant’s security parameters
to improve its performance.
Lastly, the noise growth in the RNS.Convert(∗) procedure can be signaficantly reduced
by using BitDecompV(∗) and PowerOfTwoV(∗) techniques (as in the original scheme)
where the noise growth will be around ≈ log2(V) + log2(n + t) + 6. The adoption will
improve the variant multiplication depth to be dRNS ≈ 0.72 · dSI-DGHV.
4.12 Public key size
Here we briefly discuss the extra public key elements required for SI-DGHV.Convert(∗)
and RNS.Convert(∗). In the original scheme [12], the SI-DGHV.Convert(∗) procedure
requires two extra elements in the public key where σ is a matrix of size η ×Θ with each
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entry being < 2γ, and z is a vector of Θ elements, each of size k = 2γ + 2. Therefore, the
required storage for both elements is at most O(3γ+log2(η)+log2(Θ)). On the other hand,
both (4.9) and (4.7) in the RNS variant require an storage of at most O(γ + log2(n+ t)).
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Chapter 5
Contributions and Future Work
The main goal of this thesis has been to enhance the practicality of fully homomorphic
encryption over integers, by presenting an RNS variant to SI-DGHV of [12]. The work
presented in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Presenting an overview of the mathematical definitions and properties of the residue
number system that provides sufficient background to the RNS variant.
• Surveying various works on SWHE and FHE schemes, introducing a comprehensive
description of DGHV and SI-DGHV, and analyzing their procedures to achieve FHE.
• Showing the basic concept of the RNS variant with analytic proof of target noise
reduction, and proposing the RNS variant to SI-DGHV.Convert(∗) that does not
rely on the subset-sum assumption as a security parameter.
• Providing a technical implementation of the RNS variant to [12] along with a math-
ematical analysis for correctness, ciphertext expansion, and noise growth. Moreover,
giving a mathematical bound that restrains the number and the size of RNS moduli.
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• Proposing an efficient technique to incorporate the Montgomery reduction in our
RNS variant, and adopting the ciphertext batching technique for efficient utilization
of the RNS variant.
• Introducing suitable Approximate-GCD assumption to our RNS.Convert(∗) proce-
dure and providing a security proof of non-batched and batched RNA variants.
• Providing analytical estimation of complexity for both the RNS variant and the
original scheme [12], doing the same for the RNS.Convert(∗) procedure’s public key
size, and showing the relative size reduction in comparison with SI-DGHV.Convert(∗)
[12].
To sum up, the work in this thesis has introduced a new RNS variant to FHE of
[12]. The new RNS variant scheme enhances the SI-DGHV scheme complexity and speeds
up noise reduction procedures. In addition, the variant improves the original scheme’s
security by eliminating the need for the subset-sum assumption. However, in our variant,
the noise grows linearly with the moduli size V which lowers the scheme’s multiplication
depth relative to the original scheme. In order to control the growth, the RNS.Convert(∗)
noise management requires more optimization.
Below are some recommendations and suggestions for future research that would add
to this work and contribute in general to HE:
• Adopting both BitDecompV(∗) PowerOfTwoV(∗) procedures to squash the dot
product 〈∗, ∗〉 in Eq. (4.10) which might reduce the noise growth.
• The RNS.Convert(∗) procedure carries a relatively high noise growth compared to
the original scheme that has to be optimized.
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• Adopting an efficient public key compression as in [14].
• Adopting Gentry’s bootstrapping technique in RNS.
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